HomeMy WebLinkAboutA002 - District Court decision sustaining ordinance 4"'1
City Attorney's Office
515 Clark Avenue,P. O.Box 811
QaaHrygranv Ames,IA 50010
Exceptio Service Phone: 515-239-5146 • Fax: 515-239-5142
March 17, 2005 CITY MANAGER'S OFFICE
EMA 1 6 Z 0 8 1
The Honorable Ted Tedesco, Mayor CITY OF AMES, IOWA
and Members of the City Council
of the City of Ames, Iowa
Re: Rental Property Association vs. City of Ames
Dear Mayor Tedesco and Council Members:
You may recall that a lawsuit is challenging the constitutionality of the"no more than three unrelated
persons"definition of family used in City zoning and housing regulations. With this is the decision
of the District Court sustaining the Ames ordinance. The Plaintiffs have until April 16 to file and
appeal with the Iowa Supreme Court.
Yours truly,
John R. K a"s
City Attorney
JRK:gmw
Attachment
c: J.Beb Kindred
Matt Flynn
David Brown
m_�/17/2005 08:33 NEVRDH CLERK OF COURT 4 AMES CITY HTTY NO.711 U002
/
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR STORY COUNT-Y '
AMES RENTAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, � C��)
� . E(�CVO41�31
No
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Plaintiff,
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[� �F�B' ) ���� ������� �LIN
The City of Ames has asked, via a summary judgment motion, that this lawsuit be
terminated in the C]tv's favor' The City claims that there are no genuine factual disputes that
would otherwise require a trial and the City further alleges that it Is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. /\rnes Rental Property Association resists the C|ty's motion.
After considering the parties' summary judgment record in light of their written and oral
arguments, and after reviewing all pertinent legal authority, I have concluded that the City is
entitled to summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, this lawsuit will be dismissed., My
reasoning is as follows:
Plaintiff Ames Rental Property Association (ARPA) is a corporation comprised of several
people who own residential naalesbatewith|n the city limits ofAmes. Those properties include
various houses located within areas that the City has zoned solely for single-family dwellings.
VVhi|m many of these houses are sufficiently large to comfortably accommodate far more than
three people, § 29.201(62) of the Ames Municipal [ode (A.M.C.) operates to prohibit ARPA
members from leasing w given house, regardless of 'its size, to more than three unrelated
individuals. ARpA brought this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of § 29.201(62), A.M.[.
Chapter 29 of the Ames Municipal Code is a comprehensive and detailed zoning ordinance
enacted by the City in April 3000 to regulate the use of real estate within. the [|ty's boundaries.
^- § 29.701, A.M'C., restricts use of property in areas designated as "Residential Low Density (RL)"
'
zones to'primarily single family dxvm|||ngs"' § 29.701(1), A.M.C.
§ 29.201(51). A.M.C, defines a single-family dxvm|Hng as ~moy building consisting of no
more than one dwelling unit, designed for and occupied exclusively by one family." Id. The term
dwelling unit is defined as "any building or portion thereof which contains living tud|iUes' �
including provisions for sleeping, eating, meal preparation and a bathroom, ,2 § 29.201(54),
A.M.C.
The controversy in this case focuses on the definition of family" as provided by
� two-family contains two dwelling units,,each desi@pod for separate and independent
occupancy,is allowable in residezdal low-density zones if it preexist6d enactinent of Chapter 29. See table, §29.701(2),
2 Excepted fTom this definitioix are"hotels,manufactured homes,nursing homes,residential corrections facilities,rooming
houses,sororities or fraternities,or supervised group hmues-" §29.201(54).A.M.C,
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03/17/2005 08:33 NEVRDR CLERK OF COURT 4 WES CITY RTTY NO.711 P003
§ 29.201(62), A.M.C., and as used in Chapter 29. Under § 29.201(62), the term `family"
includes only "a person living alone, or any of the following groups living together as a single non-
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profit housekeeping unit and sharing common living, sleeping, cooking, and eating facilities: (a)
any number of people related by blood, marriage, adoption, guardianship or other duly authorized
custodial relationship; (b) three unrelated people . . ." Ld.3 Theoretically, this definition would
allow ten related people to legally occupy the very same dwelling that only three unrelated people
could inhabit without fear of sanctions.4
ARPA thinks that the zoning ordinance's disparate treatment of groups of related versus
unrelated people is so arbitrary and Irrational that ARPA members are denied their constitutional
right to equal protection of the law. Accordingly, ARPA seeks a declaratory ruling that the
restrictions in occupancy entailed by § 29.201(62) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment and its equivalent provision found in the
Constitution of the State of Iowa at Article I, Section 6,
Further, ARPA maintains that the City's enforcement of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
29, A.M.C., violates the "Takings" clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.
Additionally, ARPA seeks an injunction that will prohibit the City from further enforcement
of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 29, A.M.C.
Finally, ARPA asks for an award of damages, including attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant
to Section 42 USC, Section 1983. The latter claim is premised on ARPA's belief that the City's
zoning ordinance and the City's enforcement thereof has deprived ARPA's members of rights,
privileges and/or immunities secured by the state and/or federal constitutions.
I. Summary Judgment Procedure, Generally, Summary judgment procedure is designed
to resolve lawsuits without the cost of an unnecessary trial. See, Neco, Inc. v. Christenson, 312
N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1981). Summary judgment is allowable if the pending claim presents no
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genuine and material fact issues and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
See, Rule 1.981, I.R.Civ.P.; Port r v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1993).
Both parties in this case recognized that the merits of the case turned primarily on the law
as opposed to the facts. Accordingly, the case was submitted in the procedural format of a
motion for summary judgment offered by the City of Ames.
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I agree that there are no fact Issues in this case that require assessment or determination
by a judge or jury. In other words, no trial is needed. The remaining analysis then deals with
whether the City of Ames is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I find that it is.
3 §29.201(62)includes three outer categories of people within the defAilition of"family"but those groupings are not at
issue here.
Article 16 of Chapter 29,A.M.C.,sets out various penalties and enforcement remedies for violations of the City's zoning i
regulations. Those sanctions include civil penalties of WO for each violation,and the City has apparently imposed such
penalties on one or more,ARPA members for leasing a sbagle-family dwelling to wore than three unrelated individuals. }
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uslilrl2805 08:33 NEVRDR CLERK OF COURT 3 AMES CITY ATTY NO.711 D004
II. Zoning Ordinances Generally. Zoning ordinances entail a municipality's exercise of I
the police powers delegated to it by the State of Iowa. See, NeUzil v City of Iowa City, 451 !
N.W,2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1990). § 414.1(1), Code of Iowa, empowers a city to "regulate and
restrict" the use of land and Improvements thereon within the city's boundaries "for the purpose
of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." Id.; see,
Shriver v City Qf OkobQii, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997).
City zoning ordinances enjoy a strong presumption of validity, and one who challenges an
ordinance has the burden to rebut that presumption and to demonstrate the ordinance's
invalidity. Shriver, supra, at 401. "To carry this burden, the challenger must show the ordinance
is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, with no reasonable relationship to the
promotion of public health, safety, or welfare." Id. Additionally, a court cannot substitute its own
judgment for that of the city council by assessing the ordinance's wisdom or propriety or the lack
thereof. Neuzil, supra, at 166. If an ordinance is facially valid and its reasonableness is fairly
debatable, a court may not interfere with the city's exercise of its police powers. Id.
III. Equal Protection - Unit
pd States Constitution. Plaintiff ARPA claims that the
occupancy limit classification (related people vs. unrelated people) found in § 29,201(62), both
facially and as applied to ARPA members, violates ARPA members' right to equal protection of the
law, While there may have been some arguable procedural and/or substantive impediments to
ARPA's ability to advance these claims, the parties appear to have elected to address the case on
its merits. That I will do.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution directs that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Ld.; City of Cleburne
TP2cas y Cleburne hiving Center, 473 US 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). In
essence, this equal protection clause mandates that all persons who are similarly situated must
be treated in the same fashion. 14. Treatment of dissimilarly situated persons in a dissimilar
manner by the government does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Keevan v, 5mith, 100
F.3d 644, 648 (81h Cir. 1996).
When a court is called upon to assess the constitutionality of a legislatively-created
classification of people, the court must use differing levels of"scrutiny," depending on the nature
of the classification imposed or the right affected. Classifications that are based explicitly on
race, color, or national origin and classifications that impinge on fundamental rights will be
"strictly" scrutinized and will be found constitutional only if the classifications are narrowly drawn
measures that advance compelling governmental interests.5 See, Adarand Constructors Znc. v.
Pena, 515 U,S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995); Sanchez v. State, N.W.2d ,_, 2005
WL 387546, page 3 (Iowa 2005).
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s Furidamental rxg.4ts include the right to vote,the right of interstate travel,First Amendment rights and the right to
procreate. See,Friedman v.Bed 558 F.2d 1107, 1112(2°d Cir. 1977)_
3 I
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03/17i2005 08:33 NEUADA CLERK OF COURT 4 AMES CITY ATTY NO.711 P005
If the statute or ordinance's classification is drawn on the basis of gender or legitimacy,
the classification's constitutionality will be examined using "intermediate scrutiny" and the ;4
classification will only be upheld if it is substantially related to an important state interest, Id.
"Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97
S.Ct. 451, 457 (1976) (statute that allowed females to purchase beer at age 18 but required
males to be 21 violated the Equal Protection Clause).
Finally, social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications based
on race, gender, national origin and that does not impinge on a fundamental right will be
considered valid, provided the legislative means used are rationally related to a lele ittiim_ tie
governmental purpose. See, Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S., 440; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 331, 101 S.Ct. 2376 (1981). Further, such legislation is presumed to be rational and
reasonable and that presumption can be overcome only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality. Hodel, supra, at 331-32; see, Sanchez V. St to of Iowa, _ N.W.2d _, 2005
WL387546, page 3 (Iowa 2005).
Zoning ordinances designating residential districts and defining a family unit deal with
economic and social legislation, not with a fundamental interest or a suspect classification. City
of$t. Jose Rh v. Prefierred Fa li Healtb—ca__reIr 859 S,W.2d 723, 728 (Mo.App. W.D. 1993);
see also, V la e of ells Terr v. Bor as, 416 U.S. 1, 8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974).
Accordingly, the test of the constitutionality of such an ordinance is whether the ordinance is
reasonable and not arbitrary and whether the ordinance.bears a rational relation to a permissible
governmental objective. _,.
Village of Belle Terre v. Somas, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1974,
foreclosed for all practical purposes any Fourteenth Amendment challenge to zoning ordinances
such as § 29.201(62). See, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct, 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Annotation,
"Validity of ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential
zone." 12 A.L.R.4 238, § 2(a). The Belle Terre holding made it clear that zoning ordinances that
restricted the number of unrelated persons who could live together in a residential zone did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Belle Terre Y. Boraces, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541.
ARPA appears to concede as much, but it points to the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Moo Le v. EasILleveland 431 U.S. 494, 97 S,Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed. 531 (1977) to support
the proposition that Belle 2rre's applicability has been "severely limited." 6 I disagree with that
proposition.
In Moore the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that limited residency to certain
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categories of related persons, essentially children and parents, but excluded members of an
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6 See page 4,ARPA's brie
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u s: l r��ee5 ed:.s.5 NLVHDH CLENK OF CUURT 4 AMES CITY ATTY N0.711 P006
extended family. Moore did not overrule or limit Belle Terre; instead the court was careful to
point out the difference between the two situations: "But one overriding factor sets this case
apart from Bello Terre. The ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly
allowed all who are related by 'blood, adoption, or marriage' to live together, and in sustaining
the ordinance we were careful to note that it promoted 'family needs' and 'family values."'
(Citation omitted). East Cleveland, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its
housing by slicing deeply into the family itself. This is no mere incidental result of the ordinance.
On its face it selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others
may not." Moore, 431 U.S. 498, 499. In the case at bar, the City of Ames has not undertaken to
categorize within the family itself. The situation is exactly that as presented in Belle Terre and
Belle T rre remains good law.
To summarize on this point, ARPA has no valid complaint recognized under the•United
States Constitution and specifically its Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. on this
aspect, the City is entitled to summary judgment.
IV. Equal Protecti n - State Constitution, ARPA also claims that the residency restriction
imposed by 29.201(62), A.M.C., also violates the Constitution of the State of Iowa, specifically
Article I, Section 6. That enactment provides "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizens, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." Id.
This aspect of ARPA's claim presents the closest call in this case. However, after reviewing
the competing lines of cases that have developed around this Issue, I am convinced that
§ 29,201(62) does not violate our state constitution.
The Iowa Supreme Court has not previously examined this issue (but I'm sure it soon will).
The appellate courts of a goodly number of other states have dealt with the question, however,
and ordinances quite similar to § 29.201(62) have been found both to be valid and invalid.
Several courts have decided that zoning ordinances limiting the number of unrelated
persons who may reside together In a single residential unit do not violate the equal protection
clauses of their state constitutions. See, Annotation, "validity of ordinance restricting numbers of
unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone." 12 A.L.R.4 238, § 3(b). A fair
number of other courts, however, have held that such zoning restrictions did indeed violate their
state constitutions. See, Annotation, supra, 12 A.L.R.4 238, § 4. For the most part, the latter
line of cases concluded that the legislative distinction between related and unrelated residents
was not sufficiently related to a permissible state objective. The author of the aforementioned
annotation observed that"such courts appear to have adopted a test involving.a more intrusive
degree of scrutiny than the so-called 'rational relationship' test since It has been held by several
state courts that a numerical limit on the number of unrelated persons did not'substantially'
assist in the achievement of the legislative goals." 12 A.L.R.4 238, § 2(a).
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lJJ.` I f i GUUJD �1C7:..}.} NtVHVH I.LtKK Ur CUUK 1 � HMtS CITY HTTY N0.711 P007
As noted above, federal equal protection challenges invoke different levels of judicial
scrutiny depending on the classifications drawn and the nature of the rights affected by the
statute or ordinance. See, Cleburne Living Centel, 473 U.S., at 440. The same type of analysis
is generally used when assessing an equal protection claim brought under the Iowa Constitution.
See, Racing Association of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004); Johnson v;
Lev ii , 654 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 2002). And, as is the case with federal law, Iowa law directs
that legislation of a social and economic nature will be assessed for constitutional validity using
the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, i.e., the "rational basis test." See, Sanchez v. State of Xowa,
— N.W.2d _, 2005 WL 387546, page 7 (Iowa 2005), citing Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U,S., at 440, 105 S.Ct., at 3254.
Exactly what does the "rational basis test" obligate a reviewing court to do? According to
our state supreme court, there are three aspects a reviewing court must examine when applying
the rational basis test against a given statute or ordinance. The reviewing court must (1) assess
whether the governmental unit had a plausible policy reason for the challenged classification; (2)
determine whether the reasons for the disparate treatment have a basis in fact; and (3) examine
whether the relationship between the classification and its goal "is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or Irrational." Racing A sociati n of Central Iowa, 675 N.W.2d, at 7, quoting
Fitzgerald v acing Association, 539 U.S. 103, 123 S.Ct. 21S6, 2159, 156 L.Ed.2d 97, 103
(2003). Finally, the reviewing court must keep In mind that an ordinance is accorded a strong
presumption of constitutionality and a person who challenges that ordinance must negate every
reasonable basis that might support the disparate treatment meted out by the enactment. See,
F�aclnq ssociation of C ntral Iowa, 675 N.W.2d, at 8.
The classification In this case flows from the definition of the term "family" provided in
§ 29.201(62), A.M.C.. Because of that definition, only three unrelated people may reside
together in a single-family dwelling located in a residential low-density zone within the City of
Ames. Under that same definition, however, five, ten, fifteen or more people could legally reside
in the same single-family dwelling unit provided they were all related by blood, marriage,
adoption, a guardianship or other duly-authorized custodial relationship.
Viewing that differentiation from ARPA's perspective, an ARPA member could legally rent
his or her single-family dwelling to a family of ten related people without fear of sanctions, but
leasing the same unit to four unrelated people would put the member in jeopardy of substantial
civil penalties (and it appears that one or more members of ARPA have been on the receiving end
.of this reality). Accordingly, ARPA argues that the classification is arbitrary and Irrational.
My task then is to decide whether the Ames City Council had a plausible policy reason for
treating unrelated people who reside together In a single-family dwelling unit differently than
related people; whether the reasons proffered for the disparate treatment are factually based;
and, finally, whether the classification employed has some reasonable and rational relationship to
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NLVHDH ULLKK Ur WUH1 � HME5 CITY RTTY N0.711 9008
the ends sought to be obtained. See, Ragin9.Association of Central-Iowa, 675 N.W.2d, at 7-8,
While the standard of review employed in these types of cases is considerably deferential to the
City, the review Is definitely something more than a rubber stamp approval process. Id., at 9.
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The City outlined a number of interests that it purportedly intended to advance by
differentiating between groups of related and unrelated residents of a single-family dwelling unit.
w
Specifically, the City referred to the"preservation of peaceful neighborhoods with limited
congestion and traffic" and promotion of the `sanctity of the family, quiet neighborhoods, low
population, few motor vehicles and low transiency."' The City also noted its goal of preserving
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the quality of family neighborhoods as a plausible basis for creating a disparate classification I
found In § 29,201(62), A.M.C.$
Additionally, Chapter 29 of the Ames Municipal Code states in its preamble that the
ordinance's regulations and restrictions seek to"promote the health, safety and the general
welfare of the City . . ." by avoiding undue concentration of population, overcrowding of land and
other such factors. See, § 29(102)(1), A.M,C. The ordinance's preamble also notes that it was
drafted with "reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the area of
each Zone and the peculiar suitability of such area for particular uses, and with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout
the City." W.
Further, referring to various residential "base zones," § 29.700(1), A.M.C., advises that
each of the various base zones "is designed and Intended to establish the priority of residential
uses by prohibiting uses detrimental to residential neighborhoods and allowing, through Special.
Use Permit with regulation of design, scale and location only those nonresidential uses that
support and give vitality to residential life." Id. The espoused purpose for the residential low-
density (RL) zone is "to accommodate primarily single-family dwellings, while accommodating
certain existing two-family dwellings and other uses customarily found In low-density residential
areas." § 29.701(1), A.M.C.
The United States Supreme Court in Belle Terre, supra, upheld an ordinance that had the
effect of barring occupancy of single-family dwelling units by six unrelated college students and,
in doing so, acknowledged that the ordinance advanced legitimate legislative goals such as
minimization of population and motor vehicle congestion and the maintenance of a quiet
residential environment. Id., 416 U.S. 9. Various other courts have also recognized as valid a
municipality's concerns with quiet neighborhoods, low population, few motor vehicles and low
transiency and have held that zoning ordinances such as § 29.201(62) were not unreasonable or
arbitrary means to those ends. See e.g., Stat? v. ChaMpoux, 555 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Neb. 1996);
1 See page 6,City's brief is support of its motion for summary judgment.
8 See page 4,City's supplement brief in,support of summary judgment.
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u� 1 f -U JD UtJ_ 5J NLVHDH (-LLKK Ur WUHT 4 AMES CITY RTTY N0.711 P009
Hayward v. G stop, 542 A.2d 760, 768 (Del. 1988); see also, „f1loorpsb14 L ns,Ass'n, Inc. v,
Town of Sloo[Dsbtjrq, 912 F.Supp. 790, 804 (M.D_Pa. 1995).
Other courts have been considerably less deferential to ordinances that restricted the
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number of unrelated people who could reside in a single-family dwelling,
In College Area Renters and Landl,or ,�sso vCity Qf San Diego, 43 Cal.App.4th 677, 50
Cal.Rptr.2d 515, 521 (1996), the California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, determined that the
connection between policy goals of avoiding overcrowding, traffic, noise, pollution, etc., and the
discriminatory ordinance employed to address those issues was so attenuated as to be arbitrary
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and irrational. That court noted that such recognizable ills are better dealt with by enforcement
of criminal statutes and off-street parking requirements. Id.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded likewise in McMinn v Town of Oyster Bav, 66
N.Y.2d 544, 549, 48 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 498 N.Y,S.2d 128, 131 (1985), and similar attitudes
were espoused in State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 111, 405 A,2d 368, 373 (N.J. 1979) and Distefano
v. Haxton, 1994 WL 931006 (R.I.Super. 1994).
In Distefano, the Rhode Island Superior Court determined that a zoning ordinance quite
similar to § 29.201(62), A.M.C., was based on a "flawed premise." The court believed:that "the
legislation operated on the assumption that if some unrelated individual sharing an apartment or
house, be they students or otherwise, are rowdy and disorderly, then all unrelated persons
necessarily act in that fashion and must be barred from residential zones. Elementary logic
teaches us that while a specie may have the qualities of the larger genus it inhabits, the genus
does not have all the characteristics of each and every specie that it contains." Id., at 11-12.
My role in assessing the City of Ames' embattled ordinance is not that of a "super
legislature" to assess the wisdom or desirability of the policy that underpins the ordinance. That
being said, there is some validity in the rationale used in cases such as State v. Baker, supra, and
Distefano v, Haxton. Keying off those cases, it can be credibly argued that the connection
between the classification drawn in § 29.201(62), A.M.C., and the City's goals of reduced traffic,
noise, congestion, litter, etc., is quite attenuated. As pointed out by the California appellate court
In State v. Baker". . . one can envision a scenario of irrational differential treatment arising
between two neighboring residences - one tenant occupied and the other owner occupied with
the tenant occupied house being subject to the ordinance even though its residents happen to be
the quiet, neat type who use bicycles as their means of transportation, whereas the owner-
occupied house is not subject to the ordinance, even though its residents happen to be of a loud,
litter-prone, car-collecting sort." 50 Cal.Rptr.7-d 521, 43:Cal.App.4 686-87,
Be that as it may, I do not find it necessary to inject my own perspectives on whether
concerns over traffic, noise, litter, etc,, present plausible bases for the municipal enactment at
issue. Instead I find the City's policy and goal of maintaining the nature and quality of single-
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NtVHDH C_LLhKK U- WUH 1 4 HME!:i L 1 1 Y H I TY N0.711 1;010
family neighborhoods to be valid and supported in fact,9 Maintaining the single-family character
of a neighborhood is a legitimate public interest. See, Jones v. Wildgen, 320 F,$upp.2d 1116,
1131 (D.Kas. 2-004). I further find that the classification presented in § 29.201(62) definitely falls
among the various rational and reasonable means to achieving that end.
The United States Supreme Court in Villa e of Delle Terre noted that a city's police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people." Id., 416 U.S., at 9, 94 S.Ct., at 1541. A municipality is
certainly entitled to consider the quality of living in its community and may exercise its police
power to attempt to promote values important to the community as a whole. See, State v.
Champoyx, 555 N.W.2d 69, 74. "The objective of preserving the character of single-family
residential neighborhoods is, we think, a legitimate one." Anderson v. Provo City Corp. _ P.3d.
2005 WL120508 (Utah 2005), page 21.
Getting to the point, the City of Ames Is certainly entitled to create within its boundaries
specific environments that will aid in the preservation of family values and a traditional
neighborhood setting. In pursuit of those environments the Ames City Council determined that
allowing more than three unrelated people to reside In a single-family dwelling might have some
deleterious effect on the aforementioned goals. Whether the classification imposed by
§ 29.201(62) is the best and most logical means of reaching the stated ends or whether there are
better ways to address the City's concerns is not for me to say. The bottom line here is that
ARPA failed to demonstrate that the connection between the City's ordinance and Its stated goal
is irrational, arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, ARPA's state constitutional challenge must fail
as well, and the City's summary judgment motion on this aspect will be granted.
V. The"Takings" Claim • ARPA's brief and resistance to the City's summary judgment
motion did not address the City's request for summary disposition of ARPA's claims based on the
"Takings" Clauses found in the state and federal constitutions. Rather than view that silence as
an abandonment of the claims, however, I will address those issues on their merits.
Paragraph 14 of ARPA's petition claims that"The City's enforcement of the ordinance
[§ 29.201(62)3 violates the Takings Clause of the Iowa and United States Constitutions."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. The Iowa Constitution has a similar
provision providing that"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation first being made . . ." Article I, Section 1.8, Iowa Constitution.
9 The Iowa Supreme Court does not obligate Inc to find"proof in the traditional sense"with respect to the policies'bases
and fact. I am obliged,however,to". . .undertake some exaThination of the credibility of the asserted factual basis for the
challenged classification rather than simply accepting it at face value." Fuciu g Association of Central Iowa v.Fitzgerald,
675 N_W.2d 1, 8(footnote 4)(Iowa2004).
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A common form of"taking" occurs when a governmental body appropriates through its
powers of eminent domain private property for a public purpose, or otherwise occupies some or
all of It permanently. See, Molo Oil Co v City of Dubuque, ^ N.W.2d ^, 2005 WL379800 (Iowa
2005). A taking can also occur through extreme regulation by ordinance or statute to the extent
that the owner is substantially deprived of the property's use and benefit. See, Kelp , v. Story
CoWnty Sheriff, 611 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 2000); see also, Macponald Sommer& Frates v,
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 347, 106 S.Ct, 2561, 91 L,Ed.2d 285 (1986); ]ones y. Wildaen, 320
F.Supp.2d 1116, 1134 (D.Kan. 2004). Be that as it may, a mere deprivation of the property's
highest and best use won't render the governmental action an unconstitutional taking. Stone v.
City of Wiltgn, 331 N.W.2d 398, 404 (Iowa 1983).
The summary judgment record on this aspect Is quite meager and, as noted above, ARPA
did not field a resistance to the City's claim that no factual Issues existed on this aspect of the
lawsuit. Likewise, there is a question on my part whether ARPA's "taking" claims are ripe for
adjudication. One must exhaust any administrative remedies prior to bringing such a claim. See,
MOIo Oil Co., supra; Iowa Coal Mining v Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 432-34 (Iowa 1996).
Be that as it may, and after considering the claim and the City's argument posed in
resistance, I am comfortable in finding that while § 29.201(62) does impact to some degree ARPA
members'ability to lease their properties, that ability has not been entirely or substantially
extinguished. Indeed, there has been no demonstration that ARPA members are unable to rent
their property to individuals who do qualify as a "family" under the challenged ordinance.
In short, ARPA's claims based on state and federal"takings" constitutional clauses are
without merit.
VI. The 42 U 5 C 1983 Action. As-was the case with the "takings" claim, ARPA raised no
resistance to the City's request for summary judgment on this portion of the lawsuit. Accordingly,
I will not spend a great deal of time analyzing the claim's merits.
Suffice it to say that 42 U.S.C. 1983 allows individuals in a civil action to recover monetary
damages based on a deprivation of civil rights"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any state . . ." Id, To prevail in an action under 42 U,S.C. 1983, the plaintiff
must obviously prove a violation of an underlying constitutional right. Bailey v. Lancaster, 470
N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1991).
Based on my foregoing conclusion that neither Plaintiff ARPA nor its members suffered any
violation of their constitutional rights at the hands of the City of Ames, ARPA has no entitlement
to damages or any other relief or redress offered under 42 U.S.C. 1983. That claim will be
dismissed as were the others.
VIi. Summary. In the context of this lawsuit, § 29.201(62), A.M.C., did not and does not
violate ARPA's state and/or federal constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Further,
§ 29.201(62), A.M.C., did not and does not violate the takings clause of either the Iowa or the
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v� ilr��ee5 od: NEVHDH CLERK OF CUURT + RMES CITY RTTY N0.711 U012
i
United States Constitution to the extent that ARPA members are now entitled to compensation.
Finally, in absence of a constitutional violation, ARPA's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983
F
are not valid.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the City of Ames' summary
judgment motion will be granted in all respects and the Plaintiff's petition will be and it Is hereby
dismissed at Plaintiffs cost.
Dated: March 16, 2005.
WILLIAM J. PATfINSON, DGE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Clerk to pr ide copies to:
Thomas G. Fisher, Esq.
Kirke C. Quinn/ C. Ann Jordan, Esqs.
John R. Klaus, Esq.
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