HomeMy WebLinkAboutA046 - Supreme Court Decision making Ames ordinance invalid Legal Department
Caring People 515 Clark Avenue,P. O.Box 811
Quality Prograru Ames,IA 50010
Ezcepnonal Service Phone: 515-239-5146 • Fax: 515-239-5142
May 7, 2003
The Honorable Ted Tedesco, Mayor MW 7 2003
And Members of the City Council !�„
Of The City of Ames, Iowa CITY OF AMES,IOWA
r
Re: Smoking Ordinance
Dear Mayor Tedesco and Council Members:
As you know the Supreme Court has ruled that the Ames smoking ordinance is invalid by reason of
being in conflict with the legislative intent of the 1990 amendment to the State law. I did not see that
intent expressed in the 1990 amendment. Neither did the Attorney General or the District Court.
However,it is the Supreme Court that has to make the last call. There is no appeal. There is now no
prohibitions against smoking at any time in any restaurant in that part of the restaurant the operator
designates as a smoking area.
A copy of the Court's decision is attached. Also with this is an ordinance prepared to repeal the Ames
ordinance.
Yours truly,
John R. Klaus
City Attorney
JRK:dIs
Encls.
ORDINANCE NO.
AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF
AMES, IOWA, BY REPEALING CHAPTER 21A FOR THE PURPOSE OF
REMOVING LEGALLY INVALID REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO
SMOKING IN PUBLIC PLACES;REPEALING ANY AND ALL ORDINANCES
OR PARTS OF ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT TO THE EXTENT OF SUCH
CONFLICT;AND ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
BE IT ENACTED,by the City Council for the City of Ames,Iowa,that:
Section One. The Municipal Code of the City of Ames,Iowa shall be and the same is hereby amended by
repealing Chapter 2 1 A of the Municipal Code of the City of Ames,Iowa.
Section Two. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of
such conflict,if any.
Section Three. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and publication as
required by law.
Passed this 13`h day of May,2003.
Diane R. Voss, City Clerk Ted Tedesco, Mayor
0692
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA Page 1 of 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 33 / 02-0415
Filed May 7, 2003
.TAMES ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a
CYCLONE TRUCK STOP, CLYDE'S OF
AMES, INC. d/b/a WALLABY'S, YE OLDE,
L.L.C. d/b/a DUBLIN BAY, DE PAULA, INC.
d/b/a CAFE BEAUDELAIRE INTERNATIONAL
CUISINE & BAR, STEVE SOESBE d/b/a
TRADEWINDS CAFE, ROZEBOOM FOODS, INC.
d/b/a WHISKEY RIVER, and TOM ZMOLEK
d/b/a PEOPLES BAR & GRILLE,
Appellants,
VS.
CITY OF AMES, IOWA,
Appellee.
LOVISH BEDERAZACK d/b/a CAFE LOVISH,
Intervenor-Appellant,
VS.
CITY OF AMES, IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Carl D. Baker, Judge.
Owners of food service establishments appeal from judgment rejecting claim that local
ordinance banning smoking was in contravention of state law. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Fred L. Dorr of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
John R. Klaus, City Attorney, Ames, for appellee.
http://wwwj'udicial.state.ia.us/supreme/opinions/20030507/02-0415.asp?printable=True 05/07/2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA Page 2 of 5
CARTER, Justice.
Plaintiffs and intervenor, who are the owners of food service establishments in the City of
Ames, appeal from an adverse judgment in a claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that
would preclude enforcement of a local ordinance banning smoking. It is the contention of the food
service establishments that the ordinance in question contravenes controlling state law. The
district court rejected that contention and upheld enforcement of the ordinance. After reviewing
the record and considering the arguments presented, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
Plaintiffs and intervenor are various owners and operators of business establishments in the
city. Prior to the enactment of chapter 21A of the Municipal Code of the city, plaintiffs were able to
accommodate both smokers and nonsmokers on their premises, where food and beverages were
also served. Chapter 21A prohibits smoking in any public place, with a few exceptions, so that as a
general rule smoking is prohibited in food service establishments between the hours of 6 a.m. and
8:30 p.m.
Plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a request for a temporary injunction
in which the intervenor joined. A hearing was held on the request for the temporary injunction,
which was denied. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which was resisted
by the city. After a hearing on the matter, the district court denied the motion for summary
judgment, and based on the legal conclusions that were reached in ruling on that motion, the court
upheld the city's contentions on the merits and dismissed the claims of plaintiff and intervenor.
They have appealed.
I. Scope of Review.
The scope of review of summary judgment rulings is for correction of errors at law.
Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 2000). The court views the
factual record in the light most favorable to the resisting party, affording the party all reasonable
inferences. Id. at 649. Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.981(3). If the conflict in the record concerns only legal consequences of undisputed facts or
whether a particular duty arises out of the parties' relationships, the matter is properly resolved on
summary judgment. Garofalo, 616 N.W.2d at 650.
H. Whether the District Court Erred in Finding Iowa Code Section 142B.2(2) Does
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/supreme/opinions/20030507/02-0415.asp?printable=True 05/07/2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA Page 3 of 5
Not Restrict the Extent to Which Municipal Ordinances May Prohibit Smoking in
Public Places.
A. Arguments. Plaintiffs and intervenor contend the district court's failure to restrict the
scope of municipal ordinances creates inherent inconsistencies. They further assert that such
inconsistencies create a dilemma for those with custody or control of public places due to the
conflict between rights granted under state law and local restrictions. The city argues the district
court correctly found its ability to prohibit smoking is not restricted by a state statute. The city
further argues such a position is consistent with home rule powers.
[1]
B. Analysis. Iowa Code chapter 14213.2 prohibits smoking in public places, subject to
certain exceptions:
1. A person shall not smoke in a public place or in a public meeting except in
a designated smoking area. This prohibition does not apply in cases in which an
entire room or hall is used for a private social function and seating arrangements are
under the control of the sponsor of the function and not of the proprietor or person in
charge of the place. . . .
2. Smoking areas may be designated by persons having custody or control of
public places, except in places in which smoking is prohibited by the fire marshal or
by other law, ordinance, or regulation.
3. Where smoking areas are designated, existing physical barriers and
existing ventilation systems shall be used to minimize the toxic effect of smoke in
adjacent nonsmoking areas. In the case of public places consisting of a single
room, the provisions of this law shall be considered met if one side of the room is
reserved and posted as a no-smoking area. No public place other than a bar shall be
designated as a smoking area in its entirety. If a bar has within its premises a
nonsmoking area, this designation shall be posted on all entrances normally used by
the public.
If the public place is subject to any state inspection process or under contract
with the state, the person performing the inspection shall check for compliance with
the posting requirement.
Iowa Code § 14213.2 (2001) (emphasis added). Violators of section 14213.2 are subject to a civil
fine. Iowa Code § 142B.6. That section further provides:
Enforcement of this chapter shall be implemented in an equitable manner
throughout the state. For the purpose of equitable and uniform implementation,
application, and enforcement of state and local laws and regulations, the provisions
of this chapter shall supersede any local law or regulation which is inconsistent with
or conflicts with the provisions of this chapter.
Iowa Code § 14213.6 (emphasis added).
While the legislature has obviously spoken to some degree of specificity, the city argues that
it had the authority under the home rule power to prohibit smoking in public places under local
government jurisdiction. The Iowa Constitution is the source of the municipalities' home rule
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/supreme/opinions/20030507/02-0415.asp?printable=True 05/07/2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA Page 4 of 5
power:
Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent
with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs and
government, except that they shall not have power to levy any tax unless expressly
authorized by the general assembly.
Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A.
In interpreting cities' home rule power, the court has recognized that cities have "the
authority to act unless a particular power has been denied them by statute." Crippen v. City of
Cedar Rapids,618 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Iowa 2000) (quoting City of Des Moines v. Master Builders of
Iowa,498 N.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Iowa 1993)).
The home rule scheme envisions the possibility that state and local governments will
regulate the same areas:
A city may not set standards and requirements which are lower or less stringent than
those imposed by state law, but may set standards and requirements which are
higher or more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law
provides otherwise.
Iowa Code § 364.3(3) (emphasis added).
Notably, the grant of authority to local government to establish stricter standards by
ordinance than those provided in state statutes dealing with the same subject is expressly curtailed
if a state law provides otherwise. Clearly, the provision in the ordinance of the city that prohibits
designated smoking areas conflicts with the provisions of section 14213.2, which allows such
designation. We are convinced that the language of Iowa Code section 14213.6, which states "[f]or
the purpose of equitable and uniform implementation, application, and enforcement of state and
local laws and regulations, the provisions of this chapter shall supersede any local law or regulation
which is inconsistent with or conflicts with the provisions of this chapter," supersedes the
conflicting provisions of the city ordinance.
When provisions of different statutes relating to the same subject matter conflict, it is our
responsibility to resolve the conflict using settled rules of interpretation. In re Estate of Bliven, 236
N.W.2d 366, 369 (Iowa 1975); State v. Bartz, 224 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Iowa 1974); Goergen v.
State Tax Comm'n, 165 N.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Iowa 1969); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction
§§ 51.02-51.03 (Sands 4th ed. 1973). We find that the language of section 14213.6 should curtail
any grant of local authority that may be supplied by section 142B.2(2) for two reasons. First, that
http://www judicial.state.la.us/supreme/opinions/20030507/02-0415.asp?printable=True 05/07/2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA Page 5 of 5
section comes later in the chapter and purports to govern everything in the chapter that
[2l
comes before it. Second, it appears that section 142B.2(2) was enacted in 1987, and section
[3l
142B.6 was enacted in 1990. Iowa Code section 4.8 provides:
If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are
irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment by the general assembly
prevails. If provisions of the same Act are irreconcilable, the provision listed last in
the Act prevails.
Because section 142B.6 is the later enactment, its provisions should govern over any conflicting
language in section 142B.2.
We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district
court should be reversed. The case is remanded to that court for a grant of declaratory and
injunctive relief precluding enforcement of those provisions of the local ordinance that are beyond
the limitations of the city's authority established by this decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
111, place" is defined in Iowa Code section 142B.1(3) and includes "all restaurants with a seating capacity
greater than fifty." The parties agree that plaintiffs'establishments qualify as public places.
[211987 Iowa Acts ch. 219, § 2.
[311 44n Tnwa Artc rh 1 1 R4 5 -4
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/supreme/opinions/20030507/02-0415.asp?printable=True 05/07/2003