HomeMy WebLinkAboutA021 - Order from Iowa Supreme Court of Iowa, Case No. 67650 r .
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
THOMAS H. HINDERS, )
Appellee, ) Filed February 16, 1983
Vs. )
CITY OF AMES, IOWA, F. PAUL ) 6 1 !C
GOODLAND, Mayor, LARRY R. CURTIS, 76
CHARLES L. HAMMER, MARY ) F g 1 E 1 83
ATHERLY, JOHN PARKS, JOHN
THURSTON, GEORGENE SHANK, )
CLERK SUPr
City Council, tL E �,ouRT
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Carl K. Baker, Judge.
City and council members appeal and plaintiff cross-appeals from summary
judgment and from order for writ of mandamus. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
John R. Klaus, Ames City Attorney, for appellants.
Rex B. Gilchrist, Ames, for appellee.
Considered by LeGrand, P.J., and McCormick, McGiverin, Larson, and
Schultz, JJ.
f
#5, Hinders v. City of Ames, et al.
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LARSON, d.
This action began when the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandamus to
compel the Ames city council to submit to the voters a proposal to discontinue the
operation of the city's electric utility and sell all the assets. The city and council
members answered claiming that the plaintiff's requested change did not
constitute a valid "proposal" within the meaning of Iowa Code section 388.2
(1981)(providing procedure for submission of proposal to establish or dispose of city
utility), because it did not state to whom and for how much the utility was to be
sold. Upon plaintiff's motion for adjudication of law points, the district court
ruled the plaintiff had filed a valid petition and that plaintiff's proposal was
sufficiently specific to constitute a "proposal" within the meaning of section
388.2. The court also stated that under the statute, approval of the proposal by
the voters would authorize the city council to dispose of the utility, but would not
require it to do so. Following plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the
district court ordered the proposal submitted to the voters at the next regular
election in November of 1983, and ordered a writ of mandamus issue. Defendants
appeal, and plaintiff cross-appeals. We affirm on both appeals.
I. Proposal Under Section 388.2.
The parties assert that the primary question on this appeal is one of
statutory construction. This court is asked to decide whether the word "proposal,"
as used in section 388.2, is synonymous with the word "question," or whether the
word "proposal" suggests a more complete proposition, definite in all essential
terms and conditions. The city argues for the latter. In support of its position,
the City relies on the legislative history of section 388.2. It points out that the
word "question" was used in previous statutes, see, e.g., Iowa Code section 396.6
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(1973), while the present code calls for a "proposal." The city asserts that the two
words are distinguishable and the change in terminology "was a deliberate and
solemn legislative act," indicating an intent to require a more definite statement
of proposals when made pursuant to section 388.2.
The purpose of all rules of statutory construction is to to ascertain the
intent of the enacting legislature. See, e.g., State v. Whestine, 315 N.W.2d 745,
760 (Iowa 1982); American Home Products v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax, 302 N.W.2d
140, 142 (Iowa 1981). Where, however, the language of the statute is clear and plain
there is no room for construction, see, e.g., Iowa National Industrial Loan Co. v.
Iowa State Dep. of Revenue, 224 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1974), and the sole
function of this court is to apply the statute according to its terms. See, 2&-,
State v. Sharkey, 311 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Iowa 1981); State v. Baker, 293 N.W.2d 568,
572 (Iowa 1980). Because we believe it is possible to resolve the present dispute
without resorting to the rules of statutory construction, we simply apply the
statute, as written.
Section 388.2, provides as follows:
Submission to voters. The proposal of a city to
establish, acquire, lease, or dispose of a city utility, except
a sanitary sewage system, in order to undertake or to
discontinue the operation of the city utility, or the proposal
to establish or discontinue a utility board, is subject to the
approval of the voters of the city, except that a board may
be discontinued by resolution of the council when the city
utility, city utilities, or combined utility system it admini-
sters is disposed of or leased for a period of over five
years.
The proposal may be submitted to the voters at any
city election by the council on its own motion. Upon
receipt of a valid petition as defined in section 362.4,
requesting that a proposal be submitted to the voters, the
council shall submit the proposal at the next regular city
election.
A proposal for the establishment of a utility board
must specify a board of either three or five members.
#5, Hinders v. City of Ames, et al.
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If a majority of those voting for and against the
proposal approves the proposal, the city may proceed as
proposed.
If a majority of those voting for and against the
proposal does not approve the proposal, the same or a
similar proposal may not be submitted to the voters of the
city for at least four years from the date of the election at
which the proposal was defeated.
The plaintiff requested
[t] hat the city of Ames, Iowa, discontinue the operation of
the City Electric Utility and that the City Electric
Generating Plant, all transmission lines, and all other
assets of the Electric Utility, be sold and disposed of, all as
provided under Section 388.2 Code of Iowa.
Public service plants, such as an electrical facility, are generally declared to
be held in trust by the municipality for the public and cannot be sold by a city
without express legislative authority. C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government
Operations, S 23.11 at 652 (1980). Chapter 388 is part of the statutory scheme
providing that authority, see also section 364.1 (powers and duties of cities), and
sets out the procedure for an election to establish or dispose of a public utility.
Where such a procedure is prescribed the view has been taken that substantial
compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient. 63 C.J.S. Municipal
Corporations S 1066 at 705-06 (1950); 56 Am Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations S 576
at 627 (1971); see also Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1033 (1928)(sufficiency of compliance with
sale of public utilities).
This court has said that public measures should be sufficiently definite to
apprise the voters with substantial accuracy of what they are called upon to
approve, Baird v. City of Webster City, 265 Iowa 1097, 11-10, 130 N.W.2d 432, 440
(1964); Pennington v. Town of Summer, 222 Iowa 1005, 1009-10, 270 N.W. 629, 632
(1936), and that "[c] ourts will be slow in holding a petition invalid where the
statement made therein comply with the specific requirements of the statute."
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Abbott v. Iowa City, 224 Iowa 698, 712, 277 N.W. 437, 444 (1938)(citations
omitted).
In the present case, there is nothing in the language of the statute which
prescribes specifically how a city utility plant is to be disposed of, or for that
matter how one is to be established. To follow the City's argument that a
"proposal" under the statute must contain the specifics of the actual disposition
would create the impractical result of requiring one presenting a proposal to
solicit a buyer and establish a price even before such a sale has been approved or
disapproved by the voters. We believe such details and specifics are left to the
discretion of the city council, see Iowa Public Service Co. v. Tourgee, 208 Iowa
36, 43, 222 N.W. 882, 885 (1929); all the statute requires is the necessary voter
approval. Because the plaintiff's proposal is clear and accurately informs the
voters of what they are called upon to decide, namely, whether the city utility
should be discontinued and its assets sold, we conclude the plaintiff substantially
complied with the requirements of section 388.2 and the district court's ruling was
correct.
II. Effect of Voter Approval.
On cross appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in stating
that:
If the proposal receives an affirmative vote, the City
Council is then free to follow one of two courses of action:
(1) The Council may determine that disposal of the city
electric utility should not be undertaken, or (2). the Council
could proceed to dispose of the property pursuant to
Section 364.7 of the Code.
This statement by the court apparently was based upon section 388.2, which
states that if the proposal is approved "the City may proceed as proposed."
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff's claim is premature; the preliminary vote on the issue
has not been held. While the district court's statement of the law must therefore
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be considered surplusage, it does not invalidate the order.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.